We model transportation cost in Hotelling's model as a general exponential function and analyze firms' location choice. As a first step, we take prices as exogenous and focus on the positioning strategy of the firm whose product generates a lower net-of-price utility. We find the firm locates further away from its competitor when the transportation cost (if convex) becomes more convex and when it (if concave) becomes more concave. Minimum differentiation is obtained when the transportation cost is linear in travel distance.
Introduction
Linear and quadratic forms of transportation cost have been widely used in spatial competition models [1, 2] . The main reason for social scientists' preference towards these functional forms is their mathematical solvability. However, there is little justification, theoretically or empirically, to rule out the possibility of a concave transportation cost. As was noted by Thisse and Vives [3] , in the geographical context typically, because of scale economies in transportation, transportation cost is a concave function of distance. This is the case especially when the cost of time is also considered. Very likely, the time spent on shopping, for example, is an increasing function on travel distance but at a decreasing rate. 1 In a more general sense, the disutility from choosing the product with a characteristic different from one's most preferred taste can take either form.
In this paper, we model a consumer' transportation cost in Hotelling's model as a general exponential function, thus incorporating both the convex and concave cases. As a first step, we take prices as exogenous and focus on the positioning strategy of the firm whose product generates a lower net-of-price utility level (the lessfavored firm). This simplification has been frequently applied to public choice models [4] (referred to as the Hotelling-Downs model). In political elections, the candidates have different valence characters which are known to the public. But they do have some flexibility in choosing a political stance (or policy) in the campaign.
The application of the model in industrial economics is somehow limited, as only in a few settings prices charged by a firm is not a choice variable. One example is, franchised stores in a local market whose prices are set by their national franchisors only have store location as a choice variable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and study the less-favored firm's location strategies. In Section 3, we run a simple numerical simulation to illustrate the results obtained in Section 2. In Section 4, we conclude this paper and discuss future work.
The Model
Consider two firms supplying a homogenous product in a market represented by the Hotelling line   0,1 . They have the same constant marginal cost which is normalized to zero. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the market and have unit demand. Let i denote Firm i's location,
, the utility derived from buying product from Firm i is    . For instance, Firm 1 charges a lower price than Firm 2 for some reason, or it has a better reputation and consumers derive higher utility from doing business with Firm 1. If firms simultaneously choose a location, or Firm 1 chooses a location after Firm 2, the problem becomes trivial: Firm 1 may simply locate at the same spot as Firm 2 and Firm 2 earns zero profit. 2 As a result, we focus on the case of a sequential play with Firm 2 being the second mover and we assume Firm 1's location is exogenous. 3 This captures at least some interesting scenarios. For example, in industrial economics, Firm 2 is the entrant into a market where Firm 1 had been the monopolist. In the political elections, then Firm 2 represents the challenger to a position held by Firm 1, the incumbent whose political position has been well known. Assume Firm 1 locates at .
as the difference in utilities from buying the two firms' products to a consumer locating at x:
This consumer chooses to buy from Firm 2 if . 4 After observing Firm 1's location choice, ost in Holling's model plays an important role in determining the magnitude of product differentiation. This has not received much attention in previous studies. In the next section, we will illustrate the result using some numerical examples.
As we have noted, the more-favo locate at the center if it could make such a choice before Firm 2 moves. xample showing Firm 2's location choices when Firm 1 is not at the center. For example, a right-wing incumbent is constrained from changing his conservative view in a political election. As we can see, a similar result is obtained. In this case, the lessfavored firm may earn a larger market share (winning an election) if the transportation cost is not too concave or too convex (  close to 1). 2 That firms locate at a same spot may not be an equilibrium or may not be a unique equilibrium. For more discussions, see, e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder [5] and Dix and Santore [6] , both assuming quadratic trasportation costs. 3 Firm 1 would choose locating at the middle, S 1 = 0.5, if it were to make a choice. What we derive in the following is more general. 4 We make the condition only weakly positive to simplify discussion. Note that if the consumer randomizes its purchase when A(x,S 2 ) = 0, a best response strategy for Firm 2 does not exist when γ = 1. neralize the functional form of tran rst step, we assumed that location is the only ch challenging but also meaningful for future researches. 
Conclusions
In this note, we ge sportation cost in Hotelling's model to incorporate both the convex and concave cases. As we have shown, the positioning strategy of the less-favored firm is quite different under the two cases and minimum differentiation occurs when the transportation cost is linear in travel distance.
As a fi oice variable in the competition. This is suitable for models of political election; however, it has limited power in explaining horizontal differentiation in industrial economics when product price is also at the firms' discretion. Considering both the pricing and positioning strategies under the more general form of transportation cost may be
